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1 Introduction
A large literature in macroeconomics pursues the accurate measurement of inflation expec-
tations. These expectations are useful for many reasons. First, policy makers care about
inflation expectations as they believe that increased inflation expectations can be a self-
fulfilling prophecy that in and of itself generates inflation. Second, in periods of deep reces-
sion deflation risk is a serious concern and inflation expectations are one key way to gauge
the possibility of deflation. Thirdly, the real interest rate  and the potential for a long term
decline in the real interest rate  is of both academic and policy interest to macroeconomists.
Finally, many macroeconomic models make predictions for the path of inflation expectations
and accurate measures can be used to estimate and evaluate these models.
One common measure of inflation expectations is the break-even inflation rate, the dif-
ference between the yield on a treasury bond and the yield on an treasury inflation protected
security (TIPS) of the same maturity. However, it is well know that as a pure measure of
inflation expectations this break-even inflation rate suffers from many problems. As noted
by Fleckenstein et al. (2014), the break-even inflation rate differs systematically from infla-
tion rates implied by the inflation swap market. One explanation for this divergence is that
TIPS pay higher yields because of an increased exposure to a risk factor like liquidity risk.
However, the divergence also leads to a substantial arbitrage opportunity possibly due to
market segmentation and the limits of arbitrage to reduce this mispricing.
The question of whether or not the mispricing is a compensation for risk or purely the
limits of arbitrage is an important one. There is a substantial literature (e.g. Christensen
et al. (2010)) which backs out break even inflation rates from Treasury and TIPS data by
modeling the mispricing as a compensation for risk. In this paper we bring data to bear
on this question. We calculate the mispricing for a large number of nominal and inflation
protected securities in the US, Europe and Japan. We then examine the drivers of mispricing
and test for the limits of arbitrage in explaining the mispricing. We examine the arbitrage
strategy's exposure to deflation risk, volatility risk, liquidity risk, economic risk, and policy
risk. We also examine the sensitivity of the mispricing to the funding costs of arbitrageurs.
First, we apply a replication strategy where we use the market prices of inflation swaps
and nominal sovereign bonds to derive a synthetic nominal bond that replicates exactly the
cash flow of the sovereign inflation-indexed bond for six of G7 countries. The first part of
our analysis closely follows Fleckenstein et al. (2014) who apply a similar arbitrage strategy
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for the U.S. linkers. Our analysis spans the period 02 February 2007 to 30 November 2012.1
Our analysis includes 25 matches for the United States, 5 matches for the United Kingdom,
3 matches for Japan, 4 matches for Germany, 5 matches for France and 5 matches for Italy,
yielding a total of 47 nominal bonds. We obtain our data from Bloomberg system.
We find evidence of a pricing anomaly that is substantial for most securities in all the
countries, on average the synthetic bond which perfectly replicates the cash flow of the
inflation-indexed bond is cheaper than the nominal bond. The average pricing anomaly
in the sample of U.S. nominal bonds is $1.67, less than the figure of $3.13 reported by
Fleckenstein et al. (2014) using data for an earlier period.2 The reduction in the magnitude
of the average mispricing might imply that the pricing anomaly has diminished with time, as
the amount of capital available to arbitrageurs increases. We examine this conjecture later
in this paper. An alternative notion that we investigate is that the risk factors to which
the mispricing is exposed, for example the possibility of an extended period of low economic
growth and deflation, have subsided with the settling of the financial crisis and the now more
normal functioning of financial markets. The lowest average pricing anomaly in our sample
is $1 for France followed by Japan with mispricing of $ 1.74 and the UK $1.93. Italy displays
the largest pricing anomaly of $8.71 followed by Germany with $3.12.
We then examine the factors which correlate with this mispricing. We find that the
mispricing is well modeled as an explanation for risk. Specifically, the arbitrage strategy
appears to be exposed to volatility risk (as measured by the VIX) and deflation risk (as
measured by inflation risk premia). This result is due to the fact that the less liquid TIPS
require compensation to be held in these states. On the other hand, we find little evidence
that when arbitrageurs have more capital that the measured mispricing narrows. This result
suggests that limits to arbitrage does not solely explain the mispricing. These results lend
support to structural models of the treasury and TIPS markets which model the mispricing
as a compensation for risk to back out a break even inflation rate. Next, using a structural
VAR, we consider the reaction of the mispricing to an unexpected change in the short term
interest rate. We find that this change reduces the mispricing in the short run but increases
it in the long run. This result gives more credence to the risk explanation of the mispricing
because one would think a pure arbitrage opportunity would widen as the cost of funding to
arbitrageurs increases.
1For some securities we have slightly shorter time period with the shortest being 21 March 2012 to 06
December 2012 for a pair from Germany and 24 July 2011 to 27 November 2012 for a pair from the United
States.
2We follow the literature and express the mispricing in U.S. dollars per 100 notional.
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Once we establish the correlation of the mispricing with risk factors, we then treat the
eurozone crisis as an ideal environment to investigate these risk factors in more detail. During
the sample period, relative to the US, U.K and Japan, the eurozone was exposed to more
economic risk: e.g., default, deflation and downside economic risk. Take for example, Italy
with the largest mispricing of $8.71 a eurozone country whose credit rating was downgraded
by Moody's on 4th October 2011 from Aa2 to A2, and by the end of the sample period on
13th July 2012 had a further downgrade to Baa2 owing to the size of its public debt. On
average we find the eurozone countries to have over two times larger mispricing than the
non-euro countries. The average mispricing for the eurozone countries is $3.95 while the
non-euro countries display a mispricing of $1.67. Additionally, the mispricing is more highly
correlated with the risk factors we isolate and the magnitude of the coefficients are larger,
allowing us to conjecture that the pricing anomaly reported in this paper is an economic tail
risk premium rather than an arbitrage opportunity.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant liter-
ature. Section 3 describes the replicating strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section
5 discusses the econometric strategy and results. Section 6 examines the results for the
eurozone and Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
The pricing of inflation-indexed bonds has been studied extensively in the literature (see Roll
(1996); Barr and Campbell (1997); Evans (2003); Roll (2004); Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005);
Christensen et al. (2010); Andonov et al. (2010); Pflueger and Viceira (2011b), among oth-
ers). The zero-arbitrage relationship between the US Treasury inflation-indexed bonds TIPS
and nominal treasury bonds was originally analyzed by Fleckenstein et al. (2014). Later
studies by Haubrich et al. (2012) and Fleckenstein (2013) confirm their key findings. In
this literature, mispricing is attributed primarily to investors' preferences for the safety and
liquidity of nominal treasury bonds Longstaff (2004); Bansal et al. (2010). Our results corrob-
orate the findings of Fleckenstein et al. (2014) and Fleckenstein (2013) that the convenience
yield attributed to nominal treasury bonds does not extend to inflation-indexed bonds. The
present study differs from Fleckenstein et al. (2014) in several respects. First, our analysis
extends to international markets by including six of G7 countries and extends the sample
period through 2012 to include the eurozone crisis period. We also consider a relatively
large sample of 47 pairs of bonds. Further, our analysis is at individual security level rather
4
than in aggregate to avoid any possible systematic patterns that can influence the pricing
anomaly if analyzed in aggregate. Finally we focus on the arbitrage strategy's exposure to
deflation, volatility, liquidity, economic and policy risks.
One of the first attempts to estimate the inflation risk premium was proposed by Camp-
bell and Shiller (1996). Their inferred inflation risk premium, based on the nominal term
premium, ranged between 50 and 100 bps. In later studies Campbell and Viceira (2001) using
data on nominal bond prices and inflation report that the inflation risk premium increases
with the maturity of the nominal bonds, ranging from 35 bps for the three-month T-bill to
over 1.1% for the 10-year horizon. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) infer the inflation risk premia
from both nominal and real risk premia of the U.S. term structure of interest rates and
report that the 10-year inflation risk premium is on average 0.7% and varies from 0.2% to
1.4% over a 40-year period. Ang et al. (2008) find that the inflation risk premium declined
to 0.15% after the 2001 recession but started to bounce back to about 1% in December 2004.
Chernov and Mueller (2012) propose a model of the term structure of inflation expectations
and find that inflation risk premia can be positive or negative. Authors report a premium
of 0.2% for one-year to 2% for 10-year maturity when the model includes inflation forecasts
from surveys, but estimates change to -0.07% to -0.3% when forecast are excluded from the
model estimation.
The literature reports differing findings on the magnitude of the inflation risk premium.
D'Amico et al. (2016) using realized inflation series, nominal and TIPS yields, as well as
survey forecasts of short rates apply a three-and four-factor Gaussian term structure model
of interest rates and inflation. When the liquidity factor is excluded they find a negative
inflation risk premium in the range of -100 to -50 bps. However, once the liquidity factor
is included in the model, inflation risk premium estimates become positive and in the range
of 0 and 1%, depending on the correlation of the liquidity factor with the other factors. By
applying an eight-factor term structure model to both nominal and real yields Adrian and
Wu (2010) corroborate the negative inflation risk premium found by D'Amico and colleagues.
Haubrich et al. (2012) estimate a term structure model of real and nominal yields using data
on nominal Treasury yields, survey forecasts of inflation, and inflation swap rates. Their
estimated 10-year inflation risk premium is between 28 and 62 bps with an average of 48 bps
over the sample period 1982-2009.
It also appears that theres no consensus in the literature on the direction of the inflation
risk premium. Campbell et al. (2009) reason that TIPS risk premia should be low or even
negative. D'Amico et al. (2016) on the contrary claim that the risk premium should be
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positive. Evans (1998) notes that, depending on how the real pricing kernel covaries with
inflation, the inflation risk premium can be both positive or negative. Similarly, Hördahl
and Tristani (2012) argue that when the pricing kernel is simply consumption growth, this
correlation is negative, implying a positive inflation risk premium. However, authors note
that in more general models this simple intuition is not corroborated as the pricing kernel
depends on the marginal utility of consumption, not just consumption growth. In particu-
lar, Hördahl et al. (2008) calibrate a general equilibrium model with habit persistence and
nominal rigidities and find that the inflation risk premium is positive and small at around
one-year maturity and essentially zero for all other maturities.
We complement these studies on the inflation risk premium by obtaining market-based
information estimates of the premium from nominal Treasury yields, TIPS, and inflation
swaps markets, and survey forecasts of inflation for each of the G7 countries. Further, we
explicitly distinguish between the post-financial and Euro-crisis period as an ideal environ-
ment to study the deflationary pressures in the eurozone with respect to the rest of the
market. Studies mentioned above may not be directly comparable to ours due to differences
in sample periods, estimation methods, and datasets used. In particular, our estimates are
based on nominal yields, TIPS and inflation swaps market information over a more recent
and relatively low inflation period but with potentially rising deflationary pressures for some
of the analyzed nominal and inflation-linked sovereign bond pairs. Our sample includes the
financial crisis and ends in December 2012, after the euro-crisis appeared to have calmed,
to get inflation risk premium estimates both during and after the period of distressed mar-
ket functioning. This setting provides us with unique environment to study the time series
properties of the liquidity premium in the market for inflation protection and its relation
with inflation risk premium. D'Amico et al. (2016) and Grishchenko and Huang (2013) on
the other hand do not include data beyond March 2007 similarly Fleckenstein et al. (2014)
spans through November 2009. Gürkaynak and Wright (2012) document significant pricing
discrepancies with comparable maturity bonds trading at quite different prices in November
and December of 2008. Fleckenstein et al. (2014) also document that TIPS market during
that period represented exceptional arbitrage opportunities.
Our paper also relates to the extensive deflation literature of which more recent ones
include Christensen et al. (2010) who by using an arbitrage-free term structure model with
spanned volatility report that TIPS implied deflation option has spiked during the recent
financial crisis and Fleckenstein et al. (2017) who extract the objective distribution of infla-
tion from the market prices of inflation swaps and options to study the nature of deflation
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risk.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the persistence of mispricing. Gromb and
Vayanos (2002) and Ashcraft et al. (2010) show that margins, haircuts and other frictions
may induce deviations from the law of one price. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) examine
the effect of liquidity on security prices. Duffie (2010) examines the relationship between
slow-moving capital and mispricing in financial markets. Deviations from the law of one-
price have been rationalized in the literature in several ways, including liquidity effects,
liquidity risk premia, and arbitrage risk premia. Haubrich et al. (2012) and Christensen and
Gillan (2011) characterize the component of the inflation-indexed bond price that cannot
be explained using a formal asset pricing model as a liquidity risk premium. We test the
predictions of the slow-moving-capital theory by examining the relationship between the
change in the capital available to arbitrageurs and the levels and differences of a mispricing
measure as well as the exposure of the arbitrage strategy to various risk factors.
3 Arbitrage Strategy
The arbitrage strategy that we follow has been long recognized and applied by practitioners.3
The investor buys an inflation-indexed bond at a price of V. The coupon is s per semiannual
period. The coupon paid at time t is adjusted by an inflation factor, sIt. On maturity at time
T the repayment of principal is 100IT . The investor also executes a series of zero-coupon
inflation swaps, with maturity dates and notional amounts matching each of the coupon
payments for the inflation-indexed bond. At t < T , the cash flow of the inflation swap is
s(1 + f)t − sIt, where f is the fixed inflation swap rate. The constant aggregated cash flows
for the two streams is sIt + s(1 + f)
t − sIt = s(1 + f)t. Likewise at T, the cash flow of the
inflation swap is (s+100)(1+f)T −(s+100)IT , and the aggregated cash is (s+100)(1+f)T .
By executing zero-coupon inflation swaps with maturities and notional amounts matching
the indexed cash flows from the inflation-indexed bond, the investor can convert all of the
indexed cash flows into fixed cash flows.
The investor also purchases a nominal Treasury bond with a maturity date of T matching
the inflation-indexed bond with a coupon of c, at a price of P. To match exactly the two
streams of fixed cash flows, the investor takes either a long position or a short position of
c − s(1 + f)t in Treasury STRIPS for each coupon payment date. The mispricing is the
3See Financial Times blog of April 4 2012, Wall Street Journal April 27, 2010, among others, that discuss
this strategy.
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difference between P and V. Table A.1 in Appendix A provides a specific example showing
the actual cash flows resulting from applying the arbitrage strategy on a British Gilt starting
on 16 June 2008 to 27 October 2009 that replicates the 4.25 percent coupon nominal bond
maturing on December 7, 2027.
The arbitrage strategy is executed in the same way for all six countries included in
the study. The number of days between the maturity of each inflation-indexed bond and
the nominal bond with the nearest maturity is defined as maturity mismatch. To adjust for
maturity mismatch, the yield to maturity on the synthetic bond is applied to obtain the price
of a hypothetical synthetic bond that would match precisely the maturity of the nominal
Treasury bond in the pair. For any maturity mismatch, the cash flows of the synthetic
bond always match those of the underlying nominal bond precisely, by construction. The
mispricing is analyzed for each security individually to avoid any possible systematic patterns
that can influence the mispricing if analyzed in aggregate.
4 Data
The data comprises daily closing prices for sovereign government nominal bonds, government
inflation-indexed bonds, strips and inflation swaps for six countries: the United States,
United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, France and Italy. The observation period is 02 February
2007 to 30 November 2012 for the majority of the securities analyzed.4 We obtain the data
from Bloomberg. The inflation-indexed bonds and nominal bonds have various maturities
from 2008 to 2032. The nominal and inflation-indexed bond daily prices are adjusted for
accrued interest, following the standard conventions.
Inflation swaps are quoted in terms of a constant rate on the contract's fixed leg. The
traded maturities are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15, 20, 25 and 30 years for the US,
UK and Japan. For the eurozone countries, the longest maturity for an inflation swap is 25
years. We interpolate for intermediate swap maturities.
We match the inflation-indexed bonds and nominal bonds as closely as possible, based
on their respective maturities. The maturity mismatch is defined as the number of days
between the maturity of the inflation-indexed bond, and the maturity of the nominal bond
with the closest maturity. We examine all sovereign inflation-indexed nominal bond issues
4For some securities we have slightly shorter time period with the shortest being 21 March 2012 to 06
December 2012 for a pair from Germany or 24 July 2011 to 30 November 2012 for a pair from the United
States.
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for six of G7 countries available on Bloomberg system for the time period analyzed yielding
25 pairs of bonds for the US, 5 pairs for the UK, 3 pairs for Japan, 4 pairs for Germany, 5
pairs for France and 5 pairs for Italy.
In addition to the bond market data used to calculate the mispricing, we use several vari-
ables to examine whether the observed pricing anomaly correlates with financial or macroe-
conomic variables. This analysis is important because although the arbitrage strategy is
profitable if held to maturity a widening of the mispricing may require an arbitrageur to liq-
uidate the strategy prematurely, incurring significant losses (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).
For example if inflation, particularly anticipated inflation, induces a rapid reduction in the
value of the underlying assets, this effect wold reduce the arbitrageurs' engagement in this
trading strategy. Further, the relation of financial and macro variables with the observed
pricing anomaly would also reveal important information on market's assessment of deflation
risk and other relevant economic tail risks.
The following variables are all obtained from the Bloomberg system for each country.
The first variable we use is the 10-year swap spread, as a principal proxy for the credit
risk of the banking system. Next, we obtain CDS spreads for each country in our analysis.
CDS spreads should capture all relevant information concerning the altered risk of default
for each country. Since CDS insures holders against any financial looses resulting from a
credit event, it provides a quantitative measure of the risk associated with sovereign debt.
Additionally, we use CDS prices to examine the extent to which default risk contributes to
the mispricing. These portfolios will provide information on the extent to which default risk
contributes to the mispricing. Finally we collected the VIX an (option-implied volatility
index) for the stock market of each country. VIX is widely considered as the fear index
since it reflects market's assessment of the risk of a large downward movement in the stock
market an interpretation we will use in our subsequent results.
Next we collect data on the inflation risk premia (IRP). We use market participant's
conventional definition of inflation risk premium, the difference between the inflation swaps
and expected inflation rates. Higher inflation swap rate than the expected inflation rate
implies positive inflation risk premium and vice versa. Since there is no theoretical reason
for inflation risk premium not to be negative the occurrence of this scenario can be therefore
viewed as a deflation risk premium.5
5To measure inflation expectations we take data from: the University of Michigan survey data for the
U.S.; Bank of England Survey of External forecasters; Bank of Japan Inflation Outlook of Enterprises
(Tankan) for the Japan; and European Central Bank (ECB) inflation forecasts for the eurozone countries.
University of Michigan data can be accessed from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia website
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We also examine the impact of several macroeconomic variables on the mispricing vari-
able. We are particularly interested in the ability of macroeconomic variables to explain
time series variation in the mispricing and to capture realized macroeconomic risk over time.
These variables are oil prices, overnight bank lending rates, industrial production, govern-
ment deficits, and inflation expectations. Oil prices are Crude Oil (West Texas Intermediate)
spot prices. We use oil prices to capture the state of the global economy. Given that during
the time period of this study oil prices tended to rise on good economic news, higher oil
prices should be associated with improved expectations of economic conditions. Overnight
bank lending rates are the Fed Funds rate from FRED for the US, for Japan, it is the basic
loan rate, for the UK and the EURO area countries we use Libor and Euribor. We use the
overnight bank lending rate as a potential measure of the cost of funding for banks and other
financial institutions investing in the bond markets. Industrial production is used because
it is available monthly and gives an indication as to the state of the economy. Inflation
expectations are used here because increased inflation expectations could increase demand
for inflation protected securities and also be consistent with an improved outlook on the
economy. Finally, we examine the role of government deficits as they can be associated with
larger default risk and potentially affect bond prices.6
Lastly, we are also interested in the role arbitrageurs play in reducing the mispricing. To
that end we collect data from Bloomberg system on the HFRX hedge fund indices. As sub
categories we examine the HFRX macro-strategy index, relative value hedge fund index, the
all fixed-income convertible arbitrage index, the fixed-income sovereign index and the global
index return. We choose these hedge fund categories because they are the hedge funds most
likely to engage in the type of arbitrage strategy that would reduce the mispricing. We have
also explored the role that supply of bonds defined as new issuance of nominal debt and
inflation linked debt relative to total government debt as an additional institutional factor.7
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/;
Bank of England website http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/Pages/onebank/datasets.aspx;
Tankan is available at https://boj.or.jp/en/statistics/tk/index.htm; ECB data is available at
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/indic/forecast/html/table_hist_hicp.en.html.
6Data on oil prices, the Fed Funds rate and industrial production come from the Federal Reserve Economic
Database (FRED). Overnight bank rates for Japan, UK and the Euro countries come from Bloomberg. Data
on inflation expectations come from the Survey of Professional Forecasters administered by the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia for the U.S. and the European Central Bank for the Euro area countries. Data are
available at: https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-
forecasters/data-files and http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/indic/forecast//html/index.en.html re-
spectively. Finally, data on government deficits come from the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD), https://data.oecd.org/gga/general-government-deficit.htm.
7Following Greenwood and Vayanos (2008) and Pflueger and Viceira (2011a) a supply is defined as
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However, we have not found it to be significant in the regressions so have omitted the results.
5 Results
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the pricing anomaly for each of the 47 sample pairs of
inflation-linked and nominal bonds. The pricing anomaly reported in table 1 is substantial.
By country the Italian pairs exhibit the highest average mispricing of $8.71. The corre-
sponding figures for Germany, UK, Japan, the US and France are $3.12, $1.93, $1.74, $1.67,
$1 respectively. The average dollar mispricing for the US is lower than the figure of $3.13
reported by Fleckenstein et al. (2014) for an earlier period. We conjecture that there is
a tendency for the pricing anomaly to diminish over time, partly as a consequence of an
increase in the amount of capital available to arbitrageurs. On average, nominal bonds are
dearer than their synthetic counterparts that hedge the inflation risk. Among the 47 pairs,
however, there are eight cases where the average daily price of the synthetic bond exceeds
the average daily price of the nominal bonds. There are only four pairs for which the price of
the synthetic bond never exceeded the price of the nominal bond. Distributional properties
of the mispricing however, suggest that there might be limits to this arbitrage strategy. The
standard deviation of the pricing anomaly tends to be relatively large suggesting that volatil-
ity in the mispricing might deter investors from engaging in this type of arbitrage strategy.
This evidence motivates the investigation on the determinants of the pricing anomaly and
the limits to arbitrage which we report in Section 6.8
To further examine the time-series properties of the average mispricing, Figure 1 plots
the time-series of the equally weighted-average dollar mispricing for all inflation-indexed and
nominal bond pairs for each country. Figure 1 suggests that the mispricing is persistent, and
is not a phenomenon associated solely with the financial crisis of 2008-09. Nevertheless the
peak of the mispricing appears to coincide with the Lehman Brothers default in Autumn
2008.
These findings provide initial insights on the potential explanations for this pricing
anomaly. To first determine whether the observed pricing anomaly correlates with the risks
Supply=DTIPS/Dt where D
TIPS is the face value of the outstanding inflation-indexed bonds and Dt is
the total government debt. Change in supply is defined as 4Supplyt= (DTIPSt − DTIPSt−1 )/DTIPSt−1 −(Dt −
Dt−1)/Dt−1.
8Table A2 in Appendix A reports more detailed information on the average mispricing for each pair
examined in this study.
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in the financial markets we run the following regression:
∆ln(mispricing)it = α + βxi,t + γi + δt + εi,t (1)
The left hand side variable is the change in the log mispricing variable defined as the log
bond price minus the log synthetic bond price. The right had side variables xi,t include the
swap spread, the VIX, the 5-year inflation risk premium, the return on the global hedge fund
index and the bid-ask spread for the inflation protected securities. Results are presented in
table 2.
We find that many of these variables are significantly correlated with the mispricing.
We start with swap spreads which have been long used as a measure of systemic credit
and illiquidity risk on the financial system (See Duffie and Singleton (1997)).9 The swap
spread enters negatively. We view an increasing swap spread as indicating reduced demand
for corporate securities and increased demand for sovereign securities. This demand flows
asymmetrically into inflation-protected securities, naturally lowering the mispricing Secondly,
the VIX enters positively. We again interpret this as arbitrageurs being exposed to risk, in
this case volatility risk which increases the mispricing when the risk rises. Similarly, the
inflation risk premium enters positively. When investors are willing to pay more to insure
against inflation risk the mispricing widens. This suggests that the arbitrage strategy is
exposed to short term inflation risk. Intuitively this makes sense, in regimes of increased
uncertainty investors are wiling to pay more to insure against inflation risk. These times are
ones in which the mispricing widens.
On the other hand, we find no significant evidence that hedge fund returns correlates
with the mispricing. We will explore this proposition in more detail in the paper and again
we will find little support for the slow moving capital hypothesis to explain the mispric-
ing. Furthermore, we do not find significant evidence that the reported pricing differential
correlates to the illiquidity risk in the market for inflation protection as proxied by linkers'
bid-ask spreads. This evidence together with the large standard deviations of the mispricing
reported in table 1 cast doubt on the view whether this is a pure arbitrage opportunity and
that the institutional factors might provide an explanation. In column two of table 2 we
present the same results controlling for country and time (year) fixed effects and the results
9Other measures of systemic risk such as the spread between three-month Libor rates and the overnight
index swap (OIS) rate, the CDX index which captures the average CDS spread for investment grade bonds
result highly correlated with the swap spreads and do not provide a significant incremental contribution in
explaining the relation of the pricing anomaly with the macro-financial systemic risk.
12
are very similar. The fixed effects are able to control for country specific factors that are
constant over time. This would include, for example, institutional factors that are specific
to the countries we examine.
Next we explore the role of country default risk in explaining the mispricing. We conjec-
ture that if the pricing differential accounts for premium in case the issuer fails to meet her
obligations than this should be reflected in its correlation with the country-specific CDS pre-
mium. We run the regression (1) but now subtract off the CDS premium for insuring against
sovereign default from the mispricing. We do this to see if any of the above identified risk
factors are proxying for exposure to default risk. CDS spreads should capture all relevant
information concerning the altered risk of default for each country. In addition, CDS spreads
should also capture the impact of the adopted policy measures such as the ECB's securities
market programme (SMP) or any rescue loan supplied to financially distressed countries on
the bond markets. The results are in table 3. One can see that the coefficients from the two
regressions are very similar which suggests that default is not an important determinate of
the mispricing. However, while the VIX variable was significant in the previous regression,
they are no longer significant once one controls for default risk through the CDS premium.
This result suggests that volatility is correlated with sovereign default risk. We also find that
the swap coefficient is smaller and significantly different than in the regression not factoring
in CDS premium. Part of the mispricing premium appears due to sovereign default risk that
lessens in the presence of stronger foretasted economic activity.
However, quantitatively the CDS premium is small relative to the mispricing. Figure 2
plots the monthly average of the mispricing and the monthly average of the mispricing minus
the CDS variable. One can see that the plots are almost identical whether or not the CDS
premium is subtracted from the mispricing or not. This result suggests strongly that default
risk  even in Europe where default was seen as a real possibility  is not the reason that
there is mispricing between inflation indexed and nominal government bonds. If investors
were concerned about default risk they could purchase CDS insurance for their portfolio and
still make almost the same arbitrage profit.
We also conjecture that macroeconomic risks factors will correlate with this pricing
anomaly. Specifically, in periods of increased inflation expectations the demand for the
relatively cheap inflation protected securities will rise narrowing the pricing anomaly. On
the other hand, in periods of expected deflation the demand will switch leading to a widening
of the mispricing. In Table 4 we augment our baseline regression with several macroeconomic
variables: oil prices, short term interest rates, government deficits, and survey based infla-
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tion expectations. We find that increased oil prices are correlated with a reduction in the
mispricing. We interpret this as higher oil prices being associated with an increase in world
demand. This leads investors to expect stronger economic activity going forward reducing
the risk exposure of the mispricing strategy. Other macroeconomic variables are not corre-
lated with the mispricing. Deficits, short-term interest rates, and industrial production all
enter the regression insignificantly as do one year ahead median inflation expectations and
the measures of disagreement and uncertainty.10 It appears that with the exception of oil
prices  financial market variables as opposed to more general macroeconomic variables are
important in determining the mispricing.
Finally in table 5, we look at the ability of the variables in our baseline regression to
forecast the change in mispricing. We find that increased volatility and lower liquidity
leads to an increase in the mispricing. This result is consistent with increased volatility
leading investors to reduce their exposure to the mispricing strategy. Additionally, decreased
liquidity (through higher bid-ask spreads) leads to a lower return from the arbitrage strategy.
This would lead to fewer investors exploiting the arbitrage and a widening of the mispricing.
Again the inflation risk premium is positive here suggesting that the mispricing is exposed
to increased inflation risk leading the mispricing to widen.
In table 6 we regress the factors we used to explain the mispricing on the nominal bond
and the synthetic bond separately. If there were no arbitrage opportunity then the factors
should have an equal effect on both the nominal and the synthetic bond. First, we see that
an increase in the swap spread leads to increased prices in the synthetic bond market but
has little to no effect in the nominal bond market. The improved economic news related to
an increased swap spread potentially leads to investors wanting to hedge inflation risk with
inflation protected bonds. Because this news has only a small effect on the nominal bond
market it leads to a fall in the mispricing. Similarly the VIX has a large positive effect on
nominal bond prices but no effect on the synthetic bond market. This may be a flight to
safety effect that widens the mispricing consistent with, Longstaff (2004), Krishnamurthy
(2002) and Bansal et al. (2010) who argue that investors value the liquidity and safety of
treasury bonds, i.e. the liquidity preference theory.
To investigate whether policy actions such as changes in the short-term interest rates
10Inflation expectations are based on survey data. Each forecaster reports a probability distribution over
possible future values of inflation. From these data we calculate the forecaster's expected inflation Eipi and
the standard deviation of the agents forecast σi(pi). Disagreement is defined as the standard deviation of
each forecasters expected inflation σ(Eipi) and uncertainty is defined as the mean of the standard deviation
of each forecaster's forecast, E[σi(pi)].
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to maintain inflation targets affect the pricing differential, figure 3 plots the response of
the mispricing to an increase in the short-term interest rate. If the pricing differential is a
result of a pure arbitrage opportunity, we expect changes in the policy measures to have a
marginal impact on the mispricing or perhaps widen the mispricing as the cost of fund to
arbitrageurs increases. However, if the pricing differential acts as compensation for bearing
inflation risk, changes in policy actions should have the effect on them. An unanticipated
increase in interest rates may signal that policy makers expect inflation to be higher and the
economy to be stronger in the future. As a result, the riskiness of the arbitrage strategy has
been reduced.
We identify this change from a structural VAR, the estimation procedure of which we
describe in Appendix B. We find that the increase in the short term rate lowers the mispric-
ing in the short run (one to five months) but in the long run (1- year) leads to an increase in
the mispricing. Presumably, an increase in the short term interest rate affects the nominal
bond market more than the synthetic bond market leading to a larger fall in nominal bond
prices. However, in the long run prices rebound and the mispricing ends up higher than
before the shock. A possible interpretation of these results is that in the short run, an unex-
pected increase in the short term interest rate raises inflation expectations which lowers the
mispricing through increased demand for inflation protected securities. However, eventually
the increased interest rates lower economic activity and inflation, as evidenced by lower oil
prices, leading to a rebound in the size of the mispricing. These results, then, are consistent
with our original conjecture concerning the effect of macroeconomic variable that increased
inflation expectations lower the mispricing as investors demand inflation protection to hedge
against inflation rise, however when inflation expectations subside with weakened economic
activity the demand dissipates.
5.1 Slow Moving Capital and Institutional Explanations
One proposed explanation for the limits of arbitrage is the lack of capital to narrow the
arbitrage opportunity to zero. According to this slow moving capital theory, when more
capital becomes available to arbitrageurs we should see a narrowing in the mispricing. Table
7 regresses the change in mispricing on lag returns (four) of various hedge fund indices. The
indices represent global, macro strategy, relative value, convertible arbitrage, volatility, high
yield, and fixed income sovereign hedge fund returns. We find no consistent evidence that
past positive hedge fund returns result in lower mispricing. Of the six significant returns
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 four are negative and two are positive. Importantly, we find no evidence that sovereign
or relative value hedge funds returns are correlated with the mispricing. These results cast
doubt on slow moving capital to explain the mispricing.
6 Eurozone Crisis
We view the eurozone crisis as an ideal environment to study the effects of the risk factors
on the pricing differential. The euro area is informative due to the existence of numerous
competing sovereign issuers with different credit ratings and associated default probabil-
ities that issue obligations in the same currency, therefore the impact on yields of a fall
in the credit rating of a particular issuer can be marked. The time period that our sample
covers also lends well for this analysis as it covers the pre-and- post general financial mar-
kets distressed period and the euro crisis period including the late 2012 when the ECB's
and other policy interventions appeared to have stabilized the credit market in the euro-
zone. Accordingly, we expect that the macro-financial, macroeconomic and policy measures
to have substantially different effects on the eurozone pricing differential than with the non-
eurozone pairs analyzed in this paper and to examine the behavior of the pricing anomaly
in an environment with real economic tail risk and strong deflationary pressures.
The average pricing anomaly for the eurozone pairs is about $4 which is considerably
higher that the $1.67 for the non-eurozone pairs. Figure 4 plots the time series of average
and aggregate dollar mispricing for the eurozone countries and the average and aggregate
mispricing for the non-eurozone countries. During 2011-12, when the crisis of confidence
surrounding the Euro was at its peak the average mispricing for the eurozone countries is
substantially higher than the average for the non-eurozone countries. Take Italy for exam-
ple, whose secondary government bond market has the largest outstanding amount in the
eurozone.11 There the average mispricing jumps from $7.8 for May 2008-December 2010 to
$10.74 for May 2011-August 2012, and then drops to $3.31 for September-December 2012.
This change of the mispricing for Italy coincides with rising sovereign credit risk in eurozone
countries under financial stress and the CDS and bond market diverging signals as reported
by Moody's on 21 December 2010 and 24 February 2011. Successively, Moody's on 17 Jun
2011 places Italy's Aa2 rating on review for possible downgrade and effectively downgrades
it to A2 with negative outlook on 16 September 2011. A reversion for the eurozone countries
11Data on Italian bond market can be found at: https://www.mtsmarkets.com/data-and-participant-
reports/market-data-reports
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during the latter stages of 2012 coincides with a strengthening of support for the Euro on
the part of the European Central Bank (ECB).12 The corresponding figures for the same
time period for the other two eurozone countries are $3.23, $2.82 and $2.45 for Germany and
$1.13, $1.79 and $0.89 for France. The average mispricing for all three eurozone countries
for May 2008-December 2010 is $5.31, for November 2011-August 2012 $4.27 and September
2012-December 2012 $4.74. The corresponding figures for average mispricing for the non-
eurozone countries were lower, and more stable, throughout this period, at $1.88, $1.79 and
$1.48 respectively.
During the eurozone crisis risk factors associated with the mispricing strategy: default
risk, downside economic risk, deflation risk, were all more pronounced. If the mispricing
between the nominal and synthetic bonds represents a compensation for risk then we would
expect that the mispricing to be larger and more sensitive to risk factors in the eurozone
countries particularly during the eurozone crisis. This indeed seems to be true. Table
8 redoes the analysis in table 2  which examined the factors that correlated with the
mispricing  restricting the regression to only the eurozone countries: Italy, France, and
Germany. When we restrict the regression to the eurozone countries and the signs and
significance of the coefficients do not change. However, the magnitudes become larger. For
instance, the coefficient on the 10-Year swap spread is -0.015 versus -0.012 for all countries.
More to the point, the coefficient on the VIX is 0.014 and the inflation risk premium (IRP)
is 0.023 versus a value of 0.008 for both the VIX and IRP coefficients for all the countries.
Again, our measure of liquidity, the bid-ask spread is not significant. The one clear difference
between the eurozone regression and the baseline regression is that the hedge fund returns
are now positive and significant. This suggests if anything hedge funds are exacerbating the
mispricing as opposed to arbitraging it away. To summarize, the pricing anomaly is more
pronounced in the eurozone area. This is consistent with the mispricing being a premium
for taking on the risk associated with the possibility of persistent weak economic activity
resulting from the ongoing euro crisis and fiscal consolidation in the eurozone.
12On March 05, 2012 the ECB provided additional three-year funding for the eurozone and on 30 July
2012 the governor of ECB Mario Draghi reassured the markets that ECB will continue with the support, but
also warned that ECB cannot resolve the debt crisis. See https://www.moodys.com/credit-ratings/Italy-
Government-of-credit-rating-423690 for Itali's credit rating.
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7 Conclusion
Measuring inflation expectations is a key concern of economic policy makers. Central banks
wish to prevent both a self-fulfilling inflation spiral brought on by increased inflation expec-
tations and a self-fulfilling deflationary spiral brought on by deflationary expectations. A
natural starting point in the measurement of inflation expectations is the break even inflation
rate, the difference in yields, on matched nominal and inflation protected bonds. However, as
noted by many academics and practitioners these break even inflation rates differ markedly
from other measures of inflation expectations, particularly inflation swaps. On the whole the
finance literature has viewed this departure as an arbitrage opportunity that calls into ques-
tion no-arbitrage models of asset pricing. On the other hand, the macroeconomic literature
has viewed this departure as a compensation for risk, specifically risk associated with holding
less liquid inflation protected securities. Given the importance of inflation expectations and
the dichotomous views in the macroeconomic and finance literature, it is surprising that no
paper has yet performed a systematic study of the risk factors correlated with the pricing
anomaly. This study is exactly what we have done in this paper.
We report new evidence that the pricing differential between sovereign nominal bonds
and synthetic bonds that replicate nominal bonds' cash flow while hedging away the inflation
risk is positive and persistent in all six of the countries that we analyzed. This mispricing
occurs because the break-even inflation rate differs from the inflation rates implied by the
swap market. We found that this mispricing correlated with volatility risk, inflation risk,
and downside economic risk. We found little evidence that increasing the capital available
to arbitrageurs reduced this mispricing. The mispricing was larger in the eurozone as was
the magnitude of its correlation with the relevant risk factors. We interpret these results
as being consistent with the mispricing being a compensation for risk. Models that model
the mispricing as a compensation for risk are well-founded. And the inflation expectations
implied by these models are likely accurate and useful for policy making.
Moving forward, this paper is supportive of the general notion that asset prices can be an
important way to measure expectations, not only for inflation but for measures of future asset
prices, economic activity, and interest rates. It suggests that features like segmented markets
are less important in determining the asset prices and that potential arbitrage opportunities
are more likely compensations for taking on risk. Consequently, reliable information on
expectations can be extracted from financial markets with careful economic and financial
modeling.
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8 Tables and Figures
8.1 Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics of mispricing
Mean Sdev Min Max N
US 1.668 5.979 -20.951 35.110 911
UK 1.929 6.701 -14.486 25.263 229
JPN 1.738 2.343 -5.842 9.621 93
GER 3.121 2.013 -0.344 8.393 106
FRA 1.008 2.775 -6.432 10.497 226
ITA 8.712 9.484 -1.132 31.923 255
EU 3.948 7.347 -14.486 31.923 816
Non-EU 1.674 5.739 -20.951 35.110 1004
This table reports the summary statistics for the dollar indexed-bond-nominal bond mispric-
ing for the 47 pairs of six of G7 countries. The mispricing is measured in dollars per $100
notional. Mean, Sdev, Min, Max and N report the average dollar mispricing for each pair
we analyze, its standard deviation, the highest and lowest mispricing values and the number
of monthly estimations for each security for each country respectively. The sample period
spans from 2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012.
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Table 2: Mispricing and Risk Factors
Mispricing Mispricing
10 year Swap Spread -0.001* -0.012***
(0.001) (0.004)
VIX 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002)
Inflation Risk Premium 0.002** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.002)
Hedge Fund Returns -0.028 0.032
(0.018) (0.021)
Illiquidity 0.005 0.004
(0.006) (0.008)
Country FE No Yes
Year FE No Yes
Constant 0.002 0.032***
(0.002) (0.010)
Adj. R-squared 0.02 0.05
N 1742 1742
This table regresses the change in mispricing on a variety of explanatory variables. The
explanatory variables used to control for the systematic risk are the ten-year swap spread
(10 year Swap Spread) for each country, VIX is the is the index of implied volatilities on
equity index options for each country our proxy for the market's uncertainty, Inflation Risk
Premium is the five-year Inflation Risk Premium (IRP) for each country and is estimated as
the difference between the inflation swap and the expected inflation, as discussed in section
4; the expected inflation for five years comes from University of Michigan survey for the US;
UK's expected inflation survey reported by BoE; Japan is used NATAKA survey reported
in bank of Japan; and finally for the EU countries the expected inflation is the ECB survey.
Hedge Fund Returns is the HFRX Hedge Fund global index return. Finally, Illiqudity is
the bid-ask spreads of the inflation-indexed bonds of each security in our sample. Country
FE denotes if country fixed effects are used to account for country specific factors that are
constant over time. Year FE denotes if year fixed effects are used to account for time specific
factors that are constant across countries. The sample period spans from 2 February 2007
to 30 November 2012. Significance levels : * : 10%, ** : 5%, and *** : 1%.
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Table 3: Mispricing and Default Risk
Mispricing Mispricing_CDS
10 yearr SwapSpread -1.306*** -0.973***
(0.221) (0.209)
VIX 0.733*** 0.035
(0.237) (0.223)
Inflation Risk Premium 0.781*** 0.722***
(0.151) (0.142)
Hedge Fund Returns 3.041 1.743
(2.241) (2.113)
Illiquidity 0.028 0.342
(0.564) (0.532)
Constant 3.591*** 2.719***
(0.586) (0.553)
County FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.05 0.03
N 1742 1742
This table regresses the mispricing and the difference between the pricing differential and the
CDS value for insuring against sovereign default. The explanatory variables are same as in
table 2. The sample period spans from 2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012. Significance
levels : * : 10%, ** : 5%, and *** : 1%.
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Table 4: Macro variables and Inflation Expectations
Mispricing Mispricing
10 year Swap Spread -0.012*** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.004)
Hedge Fund Returns 0.022 0.039*
(0.020) (0.023)
VIX 0.005* 0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Inflation Risk Premium 0.007*** 0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
Illiquidity 0.007 0.009
(0.008) (0.008)
Δlog(Oil Price) -0.021** -0.021**
(0.009) (0.010)
ΔOvernight Bank Lending Rate 0.015*** 0.010
(0.005) (0.006)
Δlog(Industrial Production) 0.021 0.061
(0.038) (0.058)
ΔGovernment Budget Deficit -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
ΔMedian Inflation Expectations -0.004
(0.005)
ΔInflation Uncertainty 0.001
(0.001)
ΔInflation Disagreement 0.002
(0.003)
Constant 0.035*** 0.030**
(0.010) (0.012)
Country FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.07
N 1742 1428
This table replicates the results in table 2 adding macroeconomic variables to examine the
exposure of the mispricing to macroeconomic risk factors. The macroeconomic variables
reported in this table are: Δlog(Oil Price) denotes log-changes in crude oil (West Texas In-
termediate) spot prices. ΔOvernight Bank Lending Rate is the overnight bank lending rates
which for the Fed Funds are rates from FRED for the US, for Japan, it is the basic loan
rate, for the UK and the EURO area countries we use Libor and Euribor. Δlog(Industrial
Production) is the industrial production our proxy on the state of the economy. Govern-
ment deficits (ΔGovernment Budget Deficit) are used as they can be associated with larger
default risk and potentially affect bond prices. Inflation expectations (ΔMedian Inflation
Expectations) are used here because increased inflation expectations could increase demand
for inflation protected securities and also be consistent with an improved outlook on the
economy. Finally, ΔInflation Uncertainty is defined as the mean of the standard deviation
of each forecaster's forecast, E[σi(pi)] for next year and ΔInflation Disagreement is defined
as the standard deviation of each forecasters expected inflation σ(Eipi). Δ denotes the first
difference of the variables. The sample period spans from 2 February 2007 to 30 November
2012. Significance levels : * : 10%, ** : 5%, and *** : 1%.
Table 5: Forecasting the Change in Mispricing
Mispricing Mispricing
10 year Swap Spreadt−1 -0.000 -0.002
(0.001) (0.004)
VIXt−1 0.006** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.002)
Inflation Risk Premiumt−1 0.002* 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
Hedge Fund Returnst−1 -0.013 0.020
(0.021) (0.020)
Illiquidityt−1 0.009 0.014*
(0.006) (0.007)
Constant -0.001 0.011
(0.002) (0.012)
Country FE No Yes
Year FE No Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.01 0.02
N 1742 1742
This table examined the ability to forecast the mispricing using lags of the relevant risk
factors. The explanatory variables are same as in table 2. The time subscripts t−1 denotes
lag one in variables. The sample period spans from 2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012.
Significance levels : * : 10%, ** : 5%, and *** : 1%.
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Table 6: Factors on Nominal and Synthetic Bond
Nominal_Bond Synthetic_Bond Mispricing
10 year Swap Spread -0.004 0.008** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
VIX 0.007** -0.001 0.008***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Inflation Risk Premium 0.001 -0.007*** 0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Hedge Fund Returns 0.001 -0.031 0.032
(0.028) (0.036) (0.021)
Illiquidity -0.021*** -0.025*** 0.004
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Constant 0.016** -0.016* 0.032***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.005)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.05
N 1742 1742 1742
This table decomposes the effect on the mispricing into effects on the nominal bond and the
synthetic bond. The explanatory variables are same as in table 2. The sample period spans
from 2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012. Significance levels : * : 10%, ** : 5%, and ***
: 1%.
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Table 7: Hedge Fund Regressions
Misp Global Misp Mcr Misp Rv Misp Conv Misp Vol Misp Yield Misp Sov
lag 1 -0.032 -0.003 -0.040 -0.057 0.026 -0.035* -0.078
(0.026) (0.031) (0.045) (0.043) (0.022) (0.021) (0.056)
lag 2 -0.046** -0.014 -0.024 -0.001 -0.127*** -0.044 -0.059
(0.022) (0.036) (0.034) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.040)
lag 3 0.056** 0.017 0.016 0.009 0.044** -0.008 0.007
(0.024) (0.026) (0.041) (0.035) (0.021) (0.020) (0.034)
lag 4 -0.000 -0.073** 0.023 0.019 0.060*** 0.019 0.005
(0.017) (0.032) (0.027) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.026)
Constant -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
FE No No No No No No No
Adj. R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02
This table regresses future mispricing on lag changes in various hedge fund returns. All hedge
fund returns are subcategories of the HFRX Index. Global denotes the HFRX global index
returns, the MCR extension stands for the HFRX Macro-Strategy Index, RV denotes the
HRFX Relative Value Arbitrage Index, Conv denotes the HFRX Fixed-Income Convertible
Arbitrage Index.Vol is the HFRX Volatility Strategies Index. Yield denotes the HFRX Fixed
Income Alternative Yield Index and finally, Sov is for the HFRX Fixed-Income Sovereign
Index. The sample period spans from 2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012. Significance
levels : * : 10%, ** : 5%, and *** : 1%.
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Table 8: Mispricing in the Eurozone Countries
Mispricing Mispricing
10 year Swap Spread -0.014** -0.015**
(0.006) (0.007)
VIX 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.004)
Inflation Risk Premium 0.024*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.006)
Hedge Fund Returns 0.055* 0.080**
(0.033) (0.038)
Illiquidity 0.009 0.012
(0.006) (0.009)
Country FE No Yes
Year FE No Yes
Constant 0.029** 0.031**
(0.014) (0.015)
Adj. R-squared 0.10 0.11
N 572 572
This table replicates the results for table 2 restricting the sample to only the eurozone
countries (France, Germany and Italy). The explanatory variables are same as in table 2.
The sample period spans from 2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012. Significance levels : *
: 10%, ** : 5%, and *** : 1%.
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8.2 Figures
Figure 1: Time-series of mispricing by country
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This figure plots the time series of the dollar nominal bond and indexed bond mispricing for
all six countries in the study. From the top-left to the bottom-right are the United States,
Japan, United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy. The mispricing is expressed in units of
dollars per $100 notional across the pairs included in the sample. The sample period spans
from 2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012.
30
Figure 2: Mispricing with and without CDS
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This figure plots the time series of the average dollar mispricing for all six countries in the
study in the top panel. The bottom panel plots the difference between the pricing differential
and the CDS spreads for all six G7 countires. The sample period spans from 2 February
2007 to 30 November 2012.
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Figure 3: Response of the Mispricing to an increase in short term interest rates
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This figure plots the response of the mispricing to an increase in the short-term interest
rate. We identify this change from a structural VAR the estimation procedure of which we
describe in Appendix B. The sample period spans from 2 February 2007 to 30 November
2012.
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Figure 4: Mispricing by Eurozone and Non-Eurozone
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This figure plots the average and aggregate mispricing for the eurozone countries (top two
figures) and the G7 countries (bottom two figures) separately. The sample period spans from
2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012.
33
A Appendix
Table A.1: Example of the Synthetic Treasury Bond Replicating Strategy
Date Nominal Bond Inflation Linked Bond Swaps Strips Total
0 -120.065 -121.167 0 0 -114.806
1 4.25 1.25 3.0863 99.502 4.25
2 4.25 1.25 2.949 98.919 4.25
3 4.25 1.25 2.9375 97.832 4.25
4 4.25 1.25 2.954 96.28 4.25
5 4.25 1.25 3.0145 94.101 4.25
6 4.25 1.25 3.0535 91.481 4.25
7 4.25 1.25 3.0715 88.537 4.25
8 4.25 1.25 3.0885 85.327 4.25
9 4.25 1.25 3.1085 81.865 4.25
10 4.25 1.25 3.1285 79.336 4.25
11 4.25 1.25 3.156 75.147 4.25
12 4.25 1.25 3.1835 71.973 4.25
13 4.25 1.25 3.203333 69.47 4.25
14 4.25 1.25 3.223167 67.029 4.25
15 4.25 1.25 3.243 63.895 4.25
16 104.25 101.25 3.2534 61.732 104.25
This table represents the cash flow of the synthetic Treasury bond replicating strategy for
the British Gilt. The example is based on market prices for December 30, 2008. Cash flows
are in dollars per $100 notional. Data refers to the number of semiannual periods in which
the corresponding cash flows are paid.
Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Indexed Bond and
Nominal Bond Mispricing
Country Bond Mean Std Dev Min Max N
US 9128273T7 Govt 0.473818 0.608301 -0.75807 1.56932 260
9128274Y5 Govt 1.149634 1.997438 -2.30539 5.83507 509
9128276R8 Govt -0.49711 3.365862 -6.75494 12.9232 1031
9128277J5 Govt -8.57818 2.435065 -16.2667 -2.4167 789
912828HW3 Govt 0.614417 0.720675 -1.264 2.24355 690
912828BW9 Govt 0.132251 1.76571 -3.47038 3.21973 489
912828KM1 Govt 0.650291 1.011809 -2.25216 1.99604 425
912828DH0 Govt 0.169442 1.025245 -2.40485 2.34732 760
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912828MY3 Govt 0.685582 0.466232 -0.74717 1.99447 676
912828ET3 Govt 0.918346 1.511814 -2.5179 3.76841 478
912828FL9 Govt -0.17754 1.320126 -3.02284 2.45119 349
912828GD6 Govt 0.427902 1.756713 -3.45436 3.83675 738
912828GX2 Govt -1.06327 1.996 -4.42326 2.65476 608
912828HN3 Govt 1.778408 2.191727 -2.258 15.2301 1254
912828JE1 Govt 2.794045 2.424485 -0.16315 16.2104 1124
912828JX9 Govt 0.295088 2.297528 -4.19241 5.14224 989
912828LA6 Govt 0.366177 1.325034 -2.40788 3.41761 859
912828MF4 Govt 1.915639 1.079385 -0.57304 4.46032 729
912828NM8 Govt 5.651621 2.960364 -0.68702 13.1158 623
912828PP9 Govt 4.275123 1.666725 -0.1526 7.95571 483
912828QV5 Govt 3.786666 1.936576 -0.81146 9.16555 352
912810FR4 Govt 2.763792 14.76704 -23.5621 43.3745 1518
912810FS2 Govt 3.27054 9.306411 -15.7327 35.9954 1518
912810PS1 Govt 7.256481 5.052304 -3.90816 29.4104 1518
912810PZ5 Govt 3.886574 2.928073 -1.21567 15.2888 1000
UK EF2659706 Govt 10.2992 6.158193 -1.11305 28.0361 1169
EF372237 Corp 1.754571 3.79779 -8.86609 17.0083 1169
EH600918 Corp -0.37957 3.56943 -7.13103 12.0705 1066
EI684934 Corp -6.57564 4.693748 -16.6222 3.24268 393
EG196397 Corp -1.27766 4.690193 -11.9449 14.9609 1169
JPN ED361990 Corp 1.872471 3.336213 -6.49681 13.9764 962
ED970564 Corp 1.858236 1.052301 -0.16523 5.01058 640
EF315225 Corp 1.261708 0.740351 -0.36436 2.71647 446
GER EF3134212 Govt 4.620606 2.158364 0.562132 9.28116 906
EI639514 Corp 2.87287 0.99461 0.99194 6.3381 425
EH8565820 Govt 1.902064 1.49165 -1.53496 6.14725 802
EJ0993182 Govt 1.646408 1.42641 -1.4361 7.43587 186
FR EI540344 Corp 2.746088 1.368635 -0.1394 6.39208 484
EF081090 Corp 2.934133 2.261963 -0.61744 12.2952 1134
EI112670 Corp 0.89512 1.29581 1.29581 -2.02165 745
EH212767 Corp 0.818301 2.261909 -4.26618 12.4649 1134
EC182706 Corp -1.33829 3.420107 -9.98226 15.7638 1134
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ITA ED327992 Corp 1.533497 1.508123 -2.24357 7.27873 1176
EI548734 Corp 3.810467 1.962579 -0.86918 9.55976 459
EF504151 Corp 5.065591 2.67445 -2.21454 18.4674 1184
EH378395 Corp 3.01773 2.802823 -1.96346 15.4255 936
EI230886 Corp 8.879322 2.921224 3.18259 17.1478 648
This table reports the summary statistics for the dollar-index and nominal bond mispricing
for the 48 pairs of six G7 countries. The mispricing is measured in dollars per $100 notional.
The sample period spans from 2 February 2007 to 30 November 2012.
B Structural VAR
Let qt = {mt, it, ipt, oilt} be the vector of variables: the mispricing, overnight interest rate,
industrial production and oil price. We can write the vector auto regression (VAR) in matrix
form:
qt = Bqt−1 + ut with V ar(ut) = Σ
where ut are the forecast errors of the VAR. We assume there are four structural disturbances
in the economy εt =

ε1t
εit
ε3t
ε4t
 with V ar (εt) = I which relate to the forecast errors by
ut = Sεt. Here ε
i
t is the shock to the short term interest rate. We assume that S is a lower
triangular matrix. This implies that the shocks to the short term interest rate do not effect
industrial production and oil prices within the month and that the central bank does not
respond to the mispricing in setting interest rates. We then have
Σ = SS ′
and therefore S can be recovered using the Cholesky decomposition on the estimate of
the forecast error variance-covariance matrix. Finally we can calculate impulse responses
using the dynamic system setting q0 =
−→
0 .:
qt = Bqt−1 + Sεt
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